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1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means
that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so
situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of
any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form
of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension
of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an under-
standing and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the
acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be
made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the
methods and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards
reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which may
possibly come from his participation in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests
upon each individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the experiment. It is
a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with
impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society,
unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary
in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal experi-
mentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem
under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the
experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and
mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe
that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments
where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
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6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the
humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the
experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons. The
highest degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the
experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to
bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state
where continuation of the experiment seems to him to be impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to
terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable cause to believe, in the
exercise of the good faith, superior skill, and careful judgement required of him,
that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or
death to the experimental subject.
BEESON:
We are glad to have Professor Donnelly and Professor Smith help
us with a discussion of moral issues involved in clinical investigation. The
four panel members met last week for an initial consideration of the areas
we might hope to attack in a short space of time. I have been given the
job of mentioning some of these.
Clinical investigation, of course, is the study of disease in man, and
has as its purpose improvement in medical practice. This goal is widely
endorsed and considered good by everyone. It has great popular support,
as evidenced by the large sums of governmental money that are devoted to
it, as well as the subscriptions to private organizations which also deal
with medical research. For obvious reasons, clinical investigation must be
done by physicians. This is one of the troublesome points our panel has
to deal with. The fact that clinical research involves the conduct of experi-
ments on human beings, and therefore affects the unique relationship of
trust between the patient and physician, is one of the serious obstacles to
be faced. The idea that a physician experiments on his patients is a some-
what repugnant and unfamiliar concept. Well, if that be so, can we do
without it? We think not. If we are going to strive for better methods of
medical practice it must be accepted that experiments will be performed on
human beings. There must be a first time that a new drug is tried on
man; there must be a first time that a new operative procedure is carried
out. These are kinds of clinical investigation. It could be argued, in fact,
that every doctor in the course of his daily practice engages in the
conduct of experiments with his patients. Most of these experiments are
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related to devising better methods of treatment and consequently they are
comparatively easy to justify. But there is, of course, the kind of clinical
investigation which is more in the realm of pure scientific endeavor where
one is endeavoring to obtain information by study of normal individuals
or persons with diseases, where the information obtained is not likely to
be of immediate value to the subject of the experiment. Now here we have
the nub of our question, in that we are dealing with the propriety and the
morals of the conduct of scientific experiments by physicians on human
beings. We felt that in the limited discussion we can have here it would
be a good idea to focus, so to speak, on the nakedest kind of clinical
investigation: the scientific experiment which is not likely to result in
direct benefit to the subject of that experiment. There is a notable absence
of this sort of discussion in medical writings. I think the reason we see
this meeting so well attended today is that we are touching on a worrisome
and sensitive topic. There is nothing said about experimentation by the
physician in the Hippocratic Oath or in later codes of ethics that have been
written by various medical organizations. It is a topic that people tend to
shy away from. The same holds true in regard to its legal aspects, and
Professor Donnelly will doubtless have more to say about this.
We did plan to take off in this discussion along the lines of the legality
of it and for that reason we have distributed in the audience copies of the
statement of the Nuremberg Tribunal. We would like to begin with the
first article, which is perhaps the most important, because it has to do
with the obtaining of consent from the subject of the experiment and of
informing him as to the nature of the experiment. Professor Donnelly,
would you like to start?
DONNELLY:
Before taking off on the principle, I would like to make a preliminary
statement. The law in determining the legality of professional behavior
will, except for a very few exceptions, look to the ethical codes and
institutionalized practices of the profession involved. Now this is what
happened in the war crimes trial involving the medical profession. It was
anticipated before the trial actually began that one of the chief defenses of
the doctors being prosecuted would be that they were engaged in legitimate
human experimentation and clinical research. As far as I was able to find
out this was the first time this defense has ever been squarely presented to
a court of law. Anticipating this defense, the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of War requested the American Medical Association to
appoint a group to attempt to formulate standards for this kind of experi-
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mentation. As a result of that request, Dr. Andrew Ivy was appointed as
Chief Consultant to the attorneys charged with the prosecution of the
defendants. He was asked to prepare a code of ethics to be followed in
using human subjects for medical research. As a result of that request the
ten principles you have before you were developed and, with very minor
modification, were presented to the court by General Taylor who prosecuted
the case for the Allied Nations. All ten of these principles were accepted
and adopted by the court. This, as I said before, is the first and only
legal case where this particular issue has been specifically involved. I
think it is also interesting to note that this particular war crimes prosecu-
tion was brought in the name of the United States on behalf of the allies.
The chief prosecutor was General Taylor. The three judges who sat on
the case and adopted these principles were three very prominent chief
justices of state supreme courts in the United States. Now if this matter
would come up again, and it probably will, this particular judgement
would not be conclusive or binding upon courts in this country or else-
where. On the other hand, I think it would have a tremendous influence,
and it is very likely these principles would be adopted in toto or perhaps
with modifications suggested by experts in this particular field. So the
point I really want to make is that the law really looks outside of itself
in dealing with matters it is not familiar with. The real issue, I think,
from a legal point of view, is what questions would a lawyer raise in
regard to these principles because there are many matters of interpreta-
tion presented. I don't know if you want me to continue with the
questions I would raise with regard to No. 1 or refer to someone else
on this panel.
BEESON:
Well, why don't you go ahead and discuss Article Number One? I
think that Dr. Bondy and I would raise a lot of questions about whether
any kind of clinical investigation could proceed if strictly interpreted
along the lines of these proposals.
DONNELLY:
Well, I feel that is true too. Some of the questions I would raise on
the matter of consent are, first of all, are there or should there be some
types of experiments or research that a person is incapable of con-
senting to on moral grounds assuming that he is competent legally?
Shouldn't there be some limitation on what he could consent to? Secondly,
I think this first principle is rather vague in its use of the phraseology,
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"legal capacity to give consent." Would this preclude research in the field
of mental illness or when minors are the subjects of the experimentation?
And then it uses the expression, "without the intervention of fraud, etc.
duress, overreaching." Would this exclude the use of prisoners as sub-
jects or other groups of deprived persons? As to the requirement of "dis-
closure,"-would it prevent the use of placebos in investigations? And
finally, regarding the expression of "hazards reasonably to be expected."
Is that a legitimate and proper restriction upon experimentation? I think
those would be the preliminary questions I would raise.
SMITH:
Well, I don't know if I would carry along in this line at the moment,
but it does seem to me necessary to mention a few ground rules with
regard to the discussion of what one might call, say, moral issues. Some-
times this expression is frightening and I suppose since I am the con-
sulting moralist on this panel I ought to put you at ease. Let us use the
expression "moral issue" in the broad enough sense to make it workable
in a discussion of this kind, to mean that a moral issue would be involved
whenever we seek to evaluate our practice and make decisions. I think
basically these are the two circumstances in which moral questions will
arise: first, when some practice which already exists is being evaluated by
us as to whether it is a valid procedure, whether it is something we want
to continue to engage in, whether we are justified to continue to
engage in it, and second, in having to make decisions in regard to the
future action and policy. Now for myself, I would find a moral issue
involved where there is some matter of principle or end or goal or value.
In the case before us the presence of persons in the experimental situation
is what raises a fundamental question. That is, presumably we would
not find ourselves raising the same question about some of the experimen-
tations in which some of the physicists engage in-the atoms at least
don't talk back. Now, when it comes to evaluations there is the matter
not only of the evaluation of goals, that is to say, specifying what aims
or aim is in view and attempting to justify that, but also the matter of
means, which is sometimes forgotten. There is a morality of means as well
as of ends. For example, if Dr. Donnelly will allow this, even the law
acknowledges that there may be illegitimate means for gaining informa-
tion, certain information which is to serve as evidence such that as evidence
it would be admissible, but the means used to obtain it would not necessarily
be regarded as legitimate. So there is the problem of ways and means as
well as ends, and I think one of the fundamental aspects of this whole
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discussion is that the methods employed, though they may appear quite
neutral from a technical standpoint, may very well involve rather com-
plex moral questions, as I think is fairly obvious in the case before us.
Now in any concrete situation one has to try to specify the values in-
volved and attempt to locate situations where conflicting values exist, and
I would suppose in our present situation we find ourselves right in that
spot. That is to say, one of the conditions laid down in the Nuremberg
statement is that the degree of risk should never exceed that determined
by the humanitarian importance of the problem. As you well know, one
should easily determine what the importance of the given line of investi-
gation is, and then the results if achieved in a certain direction would
be in relation to the risks involved. But I would regard that as a case
where you may have a conflict of value and when you have that these
are the hardest cases to decide. But at all events, I should insist-I was
bothered and perhaps some of you were too-in the reports of the
Eichmann trial as to how frequently the euthanasia problem was referred
to by the attorneys as a purely medical affair. As far as I am concerned I
would dissent from the whole idea that the disposition of the human person
shall ever ultimately be a purely medical affair. There will be other
considerations not only with regard to the internal ethics of the pro-
fession, but with regard to the status of medicine and medical research
within the total culture. Now for a final comment for the moment; for the
purpose perhaps of focusing a further discussion, I think one can take the
bull by the horns with regard to even this difficult issue and put it this
way: either we are prepared to say that all experimentation is to be
avoided, a proposition which I myself would find very hard to justify
in absolute terms, or there must be constraining and restraining conditions
in accordance with which all experimentation would take place, and it
seems to me there are no further alternatives before us than these,
although the working out of the second is a matter of great difficulty.
BONDY:
I should like to address myself to this also. It seems to me that the
problem we are up against as physicians is to define "consent" of the
experimental subject. To a considerable extent the limitations Professor
Smith has mentioned would be obvious I think, and probably self imposed
within the experiment if the subject were as capable of judging the
experiment as the experimentor is. There is a very interesting phrase
in Item 5, which says that no experiment should be conducted where
there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will
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occur except perhaps in those experiments where the experimental
physician will also serve as subject. The presumption is that the experi-
mental physician will take pretty good care to see to it that there really
isn't much risk of death or disabling injury. The problem is how you
can get voluntary consent from untrained subjects under the limita-
tions which this statement establishes. We have a moral obligation to
reveal the extent and risks of the experiment. This obligation may be
difficult to fulfill because of the subject's technical or intellectual
limitations. Moreover, in addition to the moral obligation we must protect
our human subjects even from risks they may acquiesce to.
An additional obligation which is not obvious but must be stated is
to do a worthwhile experiment. I don't mean merely that the question
asked should be worthwhile, but that the experiment should be so designed
that there is a very good chance that the information obtained will be
meaningful and will forward the progress of knowledge. It is immoral to
ask a human being to subject himself to any kind of a risk (and every
experiment we do carries some kind of risk) unless the experiment is
designed to give a proper intellectual reward. But this raises the problem
of how you can design such an experiment while the patient or subject
is fully cognizant of what you intend to do. The obvious situations which
come to mind immediately are those having to do with psychological or
psychiatric subjects where it is very important that the patient not be clearly
informed of what is going on. You want him to react in an uninformed
fashion because as soon as you tell him what you are doing the experiment
is changed. The question raised by Professor Donnelly on the use of
placebos is clearly a comparable one.
Another problem in obtaining informed consent is that a procedure
which carries a low risk, if described to a layman who has never seen or
heard of such things, is likely to appear a procedure of high risk. For
example, cardiac catheterization carries only a very small risk; but if a
patient lies on a table and tries to visualize exactly where the long tube
is going as it traverses his body, he is likely to get quite upset. The
question is whether you can do a good experiment and obtain basic
data necessary for your purposes if the patient lies on the table figuratively
chewing his fingernails and literally shooting epinephrine out into his
system. These practical problems have to be solved if we are going to
be able to do medical experimentation. I don't believe the first state-
ment in the Nuremberg principles permits appropriate handling of these
questions. To a considerable extent it seems to me that the responsibility
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here must lie with the experimentor or with some governing body which
will supervise the experimentor. Most of you know that here at Yale
we have tried to control such experiments by establishing a body which
supervises such research and sees to it that the enthusiastic scientist
remains within very reasonable bounds. But such a committee can take
only a small part of the responsibility because during the course of the
experiment the responsible scientist must always be in a position to evaluate
not only what he is doing and the risk to the patient, but also whether
he is exceeding the consent which he obtained from his subject. By
pushing his experiment a little further he may perhaps be going beyond
what the subject expected and leading him into an unwarranted risk.
SMITH:
Well, gentlemen, even if we were to agree, as I think I would, that
if one took the first extended proposition and tried to apply it quite
precisely, exactly, and literally with a minimum of ambiguity and appli-
cation, then I think it would eliminate an effective practice. But I wonder
if this isn't the case with regard to any code, and that one of the things
one has to see is that without a set of boundary conditions the situation
might very well turn out to be much less satisfactory than it would be
with one, even though one could not fulfill these to the letter of the law.
I think you and I, (or perhaps I shouldn't implicate you) let me say I
think I can find some fairly respectable reasons why each of these con-
ditions is laid down.
BONDY:
Oh yes, I agree. As you read this for the first time it sounds like a
perfectly logical and reasonable code to follow. And in fact, my first
reaction on reading this is to say that I would be upset if I thought I
would ever break such a code. However, to be perfectly honest, I have
done some things which did not follow the letter of the code. It is as
I think about this, that I begin to worry about where the limits should be.
Let me ask you a question in another direction. It is all very well to say
that you have a code which lays out the ideal practice. This is easy to set
up in many situations. But where do you stop once you have started break-
ing the code? Is it useful to have a code which is unrealistic?
SMITH:
Well, I suppose if one puts it that way, that is a question that sort of
answers itself. But on the other hand, what is the point of a code if it is
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simply a formulation of what one in fact already does. You see I take it
that we have this topic-we are here discussing this topic because we are
worried about something. Now it may very well be that one is worried
about things one already does, or one is worried about something that
one may be inclined to do. And among other things, as frequently happens
in the case of discussion of moral issues, what one looks for really is
some justification for what one does such that we can remove ourselves
from the sense that we are acting in a wholly haphazard way, in a wholly
unjustified way, acting in a way to which there is neither reason nor right.
Now, it is unfair to attempt to answer a hard question by putting up
another question. Let me try to answer the first question. You see, from
my standpoint, and I am afraid I will lose my post now as consulting
moralist-my approach to problems of this kind is that unless one has
some conditions which in the end are incapable of being exactly adhered
to, that you really have nothing to give you a bad conscience. And to
overcome the possibility of misuse, you see, one of the things that happens
in cases where human freedom is involved is that invariably we try to
justify whatever practice we think is technically demanding by showing
that we are doing it for a good end. I mean, that is both the best defense
and the last refuge of a scoundrel. One must not overlook both possibilities.
Where you have a human being who can talk back, who at least from
some of the things I read and from the July orations and even commence-
ment speeches, a human being who is supposed to be distinguished from
a thing, and distingttished from a thing in part because of certain rights
which he bears and certain values which he has, you also have the pos-
sibility of misuse of freedom. Now again you can say as you did before,
that you like to have a rational code, etc., which is quite logical as long
as that is not a prelude to calling it irrelevant. I would want to say
that without it you haven't got much way of restraining the possibility of
misuse of freedom. I am very much concerned about that side of the
matter insofar as there is a moral issue in this at all-the possibility of
the misuse of freedom when we are dealing with human persons. So I
come back to this again. On the one hand, I agree with you that this
statement is not realistic in a certain sense, as it seems to bypass the
harder questions. On the other hand, it allows us to evaluate the situation
better when we have a document which clearly is intended to protect the
rights of persons, especially in a situation, and it is not so long ago
when the rights of persons were very vigorously violated. In order to
make that statement one has to have some grounds to complain, and on
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what ground will you complain except that you have some ideal which
judges the practice in which you are actually engaged.
BEESON:
I think we must read the Nuremberg Code in reference to the conditions
under which it was written. This is a wonderful document to say why the
war crimes were atrocities, but it is not a very good guide to clinical
investigation which is done with high motives.
DONNELLY:
Well, I would certainly agree with that. Again I am troubled by the
point that Dr. Smith raised. What is the role of the law in situations
like this? Is it merely to set out and specify broad ethical guide lines, or
should it try to intervene and deal with specific instances? I am inclined
to think that the legal forum is not the proper place to deal with these
issues in detail. I do think it should try to enunciate broad ethical
principles which should govern experimentation on human beings. Now
how should the details be worked out? One of the ways which appeals
to me would be through the medical profession itself, through institutional
organizations that exercise control over various experimentors. Any
qualified person who conforms to the standards enunciated by these pro-
fessional groups should be immunized from legal liability, except in the
most far-reaching cases.
BONDY:
But the only trouble is that the German doctors who were on trial
were initially men who could qualify by your standards, and the ex-
periments they started out to do may have been reasonable, at least at
first. The trouble is not that they didn't start out with defensible
standards, but that they made exceptions; and soon found themselves in
a moral vacuum in which each experimentor pushed as far as he could
justify himself. This is the thing that is worrying me. I am not quarreling
with your idea of an ideal. I think this is fine, but we have to make
specific day to day decisions, and the question is how far can you go from
the ideal before you begin to worry. It is entirely a matter of conscience
as far as I can see. Each person's conscience will probably be a little
different and there are some people who will be inclined to go quite a
long way while other people will be inclined to stick very close to the
letter. I can think of one physician who refused, for example, to get
involved in a certain kind of human experiment which I myself would
have considered perfectly legitimate. Since he was unwilling to study
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humans, he worked on animals. I don't want to get into the argument
about vivisection, but there are people who would say that this is not
a fair choice either. The animals certainly cannot give you consent.
BEESON:
As everybody knows there are far better laws for protecting animals
than for protecting people in this business. I think in regard to the con-
science of the physician, etc., one of the eroding things that does affect
us is that physicians are accustomed to the fact that everything they do
has a risk; every treatment has a potentiality for harming the patient;
consequently the physician is constantly making a judgement whether a
thing is more likely to help than to hinder. As a matter of fact we
simply could not treat patients if we told them in advance every toxic
effect of the treatment or diagnostic procedure we contemplated using in
their case. We have to make that decision and we rely on the patient's
trust and the fact that he cannot put himself in our place, and we make
this decision. So we come to the business of clinical investigation and
measure the risk; and the risk may be in our minds small, yet if we were
to tell a person of all the possible things that could go wrong in the course
of the experiment he probably would not wish to submit to it. This
despite the fact, and I think this ought to be pointed out, that it is
surprising how willing people are to submit to clinical experiments, to
having tests made upon themselves, even when they realize these are
tests which are made purely for knowledge and not with the idea of bene-
fiting them directly.
SMITH:
May I just ask this question? When you speak about "purely for
knowledge and not for the purpose of benefiting them directly," do you
mean to imply that there would be no consideration at all as to whether
anybody is benefited? I take it you don't mean that.
BEESON:
Oh, no, I think we all assume that all knowledge is likely to be useful,
but it is very difficult to say at the time it is gained what its ultimate
significance will be. We are trying to build a foundation of clinical science
on which better practice can evolve. We can certainly look back over the
past couple of decades and see areas where the findings of pure, non-
therapeutic clinical investigation have enormously improved our manage-
ment of such things as heart disease or kidney disease and have really
revolutionized certain areas of surgery.
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SMITH:
In other words, you would regard medical knowledge as being, if you
want, practically oriented. That is to say, in physics or mathematics it
is possible, for example, to put the puzzle as any number the sum of four
squares. That is a respectable puzzle and as a matter of fact, it has been
answered, but we would give a fellow a grant for doing that and we
wouldn't pay any attention to whether it would be possible to build a
transistor with the answer. It might turn out that somebody will stumble
across this and do that, but that is not part of the original intention.
Now in regard to physics, I think it is a similar matter. One might
say, look, what is the ultimate constitution of matter? Are there eleven
particles or twelve? This then can be a subject for research such that
once again we might be inclined to say, well, perhaps we can do some-
thing with the results but it was no part or proper part of the intention
of the enterprise that somebody will have this engineering consequence.
But now, is medicine ever in the same position? This is not a rhetorical
question, which means that I know the answer, but I really would like
to hear in the context of our discussion whether you think it would be
appropriate for somebody to come along and say we are going to make
certain investigations, let's say with regard to this individual here before
us, that is absolutely the same case as the problem of the sum of four
squares and the number of ultimate particles; or would it always be
presumed that there was some kind of a context in which there was some
disease ultimately leading to treatment as a result of the experiment?
You must have that boundary condition in the back of your mind. Is not
medical knowledge, even at its purest, always called practical; or have
the doctors also been bitten by the bug of useless knowledge?
BONDY:
I am very much interested in "useless" knowledge but it is difficult for
me to think of any experiment you could do on a human being that couldn't
in some way pertain ultimately to an improvement of our understanding
about human function and, therefore, presumably to how to make sick
patients healthy. As I say, I can't visualize an absolutely "pure" experi-
ment. The closest thing I can think of off hand, for example, is an attempt
to find out whether the genetic code which is known to work on bacteria
would also work on humans; but even here the ultimate hope might be
that some day you could manipulate the genes and in this way cure
genetic disease. In the long run there might still be a practical value
to such research.
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I should like to come back to something we discussed earlier which
bothers me a lot. That is the double role which the clinical investigator
plays as both the physician and the scientist. This is a very touchy point
because most of the experimental subjects come into your hands because
they are patients. Occasionally they may become available because you ask
for volunteers from a prison or a Boy Scout Troop, but even there you
have a special rapport which hinges on the fact that you are a physician.
The attitude of a subject toward you is strongly conditioned by the fact that
you are a doctor of medicine. This frequently produces a conflict because
the experiment very often requires manipulations that are not properly in
line with what a physician does. The object is not to improve people but
to learn from them. I might cite some experiments carried out in this
country in which prisoners agreed to be inoculated with the agents of
typhoid fever and malaria. This is just the opposite of a physician's
usual practice. The objectives of these experiments are excellent, but the
experiments themselves are anti-medical. They are useful; they may be
justified; but the physician who is in charge of these experiments is in
a very difficult position.
BEESON:
The reasons for conducting such experiments are persuasive. Typhoid
fever, for example, is a disease that occurs only in man; there is no animal
counterpart for it. We need a better vaccine against typhoid fever. These
people think and feel that the slight risk they incur in producing the
disease, under the best possible conditions and with a curative therapy
always at hand, is worth while when balanced against great value of a better
vaccine. The same goes for malaria, which is one of the major diseases of
the world at the present time. A curative therapy is available and it was
felt justifiable to induce malaria in certain individuals.
DONNELLY:
Well, I would like to make just one or two comments. Even though
it were possible to develop a defense from a legal point of view in regard
to an experiment, is it really desirable to deprive a person who may have
been injured from any compensation? Given the fact that most medical
research, as I understand it, is being conducted by government and various
institutions and organizations, shouldn't there be something equivalent to
Workmen's Compensation or some sort of insurance program so that in
the event anyone were injured in any way he would be compensated for
that injury? I dislike to approve a defense in this area which would com-
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pletely exonerate the investigator although he might not have been at fault.
To place the loss upon the person who has volunteered for an experiment
which is of great value to society as a whole and to deprive him of any sort
of relief or compensation offends me.
BEESON:
Along that line perhaps you can tell us whether you think the practical
item of malpractice insurance would protect a doctor from a suit which
was based on a piece of clinical investigation.
DONNELLY:
Well, that raises a very complicated question which I don't think I am
really competent to answer. I think one of the real dangers here is getting
the whole malpractice problem involved in clinical research or medical
experimentation. I think on the whole they are two separate problems.
The malpractice cases that come up are usually based upon the theory
that the physician departed from well recognized and established practices.
It is not a question of experimentation but of a failure to conform. I
think that experimentation should be recognized as a separate and
distinct matter and, if the investigator complies with the standards that
have been set up by responsible groups for conduct of experimentation,
he should be protected. I would think that some kind of an insurance
program, either public or private, could be devised to provide him with
adequate protection and at the same time adequately compensate the
subject.
SMITH:
I would want to defend you on the point that the sharp distinction
between experiments and treatment is probably a mistake. One must
understand what is actually happening; to see that every move which is
made in the process of treatment involves some kind of risk, and is
in a rudimentary sense, an experiment. Let me see if I can briefly offer
an analogy from another sphere - education for example. Students
generally feel that we have some timeless and spaceless place in which we
work out all the principles and having gotten them worked out we apply
them to the educational process so that at any given point no ex-
perimenting is going on. When experimenting is going on, or should
be all the time; the student, if you want, is a guinea pig. Now I
think applying it over here (I am sure in the popular imagination these
two things are quite separated)-if we were to break down the sharp
distinction between experiment and treatment where one is supposed to
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involve the application of safe secure knowledge, established practice, etc.,
and the other which is supposed to be moving into the absolutely unknown
-if one were to narrow the gap and not make an absolute dichotomy
between those two, then I think it would be a little more understandable
that risk is involved perhaps to a lesser extent all the way along the
line. When we make explicit that experimentation in this sense, now the
fully explicit sense to which we understand it, means an intensifica-
tion of something which is already going on, and not the introduction of
something which is absolutely new, then the risk does not seem so immense.
BONDY:
Except for one thing and that is what I alluded to in the beginning,
namely, that the experiment in the sense we are talking about is a designed
attempt to obtain knowledge. What happens in the practice of medicine
is usually undesigned and rather haphazard. In the course of designing
the attempt to gain knowledge you introduce risk to people who would
not be at risk under the course of treatment-the controls, if you like,
or the normals. This is the place, it seems to me, where you might have
difficulty if somebody criticized you, not for malpractice, but for assault.
In fact, I would like to ask whether a man can give consent to be
assaulted? If you do something which damages him even though he said
you could, can he revoke his consent?
DONNELLY:
Well, I had that in mind in my introductory remarks when I said that
there are certain overriding ethical and moral considerations that the
law itself imposes. There are certain crimes that one can't consent to.
Euthanasia murder, for example, or abortion in a non-therapeutic sense.
The law feels that this particular activity is one that society condemns
to the degree that the individual has no power to consent to it. The same
is true of an aggravated assault.
BEFESON:
I am going to call on Dr. J. W. Hollingsworth, who is Chairman of
the Committee on Clinical Investigation in this Medical Center. I wonder
if you would like to say something about the procedures that are standard
here.
HOLLINGSWORTH:
Recognizing some of these problems you have heard about, the Dean,
I think five or six years ago, set up the Committee on Clinical Investigation.
We have so far limited our activities to these areas in which people
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are being used as subjects, and not in which they are having potentially
direct therapeutic benefits from some procedure. We ask that members
of the faculty submit a fairly brief protocol to this Committee and let us
look it over to be sure that it complies in general with the sort of principles
which are enunciated, I think, in the Nuremberg Document, although we
have used no specifics in this. In general is it a safe experiment, is it
likely to show something? It certainly is not an absolute safeguard against
something happening in clinical investigation, but I think that perhaps
we have managed to slow down, and I think Professor Smith's comments
about constraining and restraining influence has been what we have
been. We have made people stop and get together a protocol and wait a
couple of weeks for an answer. We have made investigators to some extent
stop and think whether they really want to get the piece of information
enough to go through this modest amount of rigmarole. We have not gone
beyond this into the area of direct therapeutics although we do expect to
have a panel available to help a physician decide whether a new drug is
worth clinical testing and whether the preclinical pharmacology has been
properly done, etc.
BEESON:
Dean Lippard,* would you care to make any comments?
LIPPARD:
I would like to emphasize two points. One thing that Dr. Beeson said:
whenever a physician treats a patient he is taking a calculated risk. I
think it is safe to say there is nothing that is therapeutically successful
which does not entail a risk. The risk may be one in a million or it may be
one in two. When you assume the responsibility of a physician you are
supposed to know how far you are going in that gamble so that we
are all experimenting every day. The other point that seems to me is
important is that there is distinction between some deliberate experi-
mentation and casual experimentation which takes place along with very
well recognized diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. Our interest and
our concern has been directed largely toward what Dr. Hollingsworth
said. Those that are more deliberate in nature in which you take a
normal person or a person who is not likely to be benefited in any way by
the procedure you are planning to carry out in order that an answer may
be obtained to a question considered to be important because of the results
it may bring about in desired diagnostic value or therapeutic results.
*Dr. Vernon W. Lippard, Dean, School of Medicine.
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Now one point which hasn't been made is that there is a lot of good
clinical investigation going on every day which entails almost no danger
to the patient. That is to say, nature has established experiments for
us. When a patient comes in with loss of function of most of his thyroid,
there is an experiment beautifully set up in which observations can be
made with no likelihood of doing the patient any harm. The harm has been
done by nature and you are taking advantage of a natural experiment
set up for you. This constitutes, I would be willing to bet, 90 or 95 per
cent of the clinical investigation which goes on. It really has been quite
surprising how infrequently Dr. Hollingsworth's committee has been called
upon to pass judgement on the more deliberate type of experiment.
BONDY:
It should be recognized that even passive observation can entail risk,
though. Suppose that all you were going to do was follow the patient
until he gets better, but you keep him in the hospital an extra few weeks
while you do this and he gets a staphylococcal infection which he is much
more likely to get in the hospital than at home. Another problem is:
although nature has made the experiment, nature has not necessarily
made it easy to do the observations which are most meaningful. For
example, some papers were published recently on cardiopulmonary function
in patients with hypothyroidism. The hypothyroidism was provided by
the Lord but the catheters which were passed and the breathing tests, etc.,
were imposed on the patient by the physician. Without them we would not
have gained much extra knowledge. So I don't think that the experiments
of nature, however valuable they may be, really answer any part of this
question. We still are up against the same fundamental problem.
Audience Question:
Do you believe that it is O.K. to go ahead with this without the patient's
consent? This seems to be terribly important. Another question in the
same regard. Do patients imply their consent for experiments when they
allow themselves to be admitted not to a general hospital but say to a
research unit or to a university hospital or to a place like the National
Institutes of Health?
DONNELLY:
I think consent is fundamental. The difficult problem is defining what is
meant by consent and in determining how much awareness the subject
has as to what is going to happen to him. It is particularly crucial in
dealing with the mentally ill, or with children. Will consent by a guardian
471YALE JOURNAL OF BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE
or the parent be sufficient? So I would say that while consent is funda-
mental it is still up in the air as to just what is meant by it. This is
a matter which the law really hasn't worked out in any detail, and I
couldn't answer specifically what is meant by it.
BONDY:
I should like to comment briefly about the question about research
institutes, including our own research ward. People will often consent
to be experimental subjects for a reward. The reward in this instance is
free medical care, which often can save them a great deal of money.
Prisoners may consent because they believe, in spite of being informed
to the contrary, that being experimental subjects may shorten their
sentences, or improve their chances of parole. The one important reser-
vation is that when a patient or subject has volunteered under these
circumstances he should not be coerced into continuing the experiment if
he decides on further experience that he wants to quit. Of course, he
can sign out of the hospital or institute if he doesn't like what we are
doing to him. In one sense, therefore, consent is implied when a person
goes to an experimental unit. He wouldn't go there if he didn't expect
to be experimented on. Moreover, he must sign a very specific consent
form before being admitted. On the other hand, I don't think that just
because he is there the experimentor should consider him private property
until the experiment is completed.
DONNELLY:
This issue of implied consent comes up chiefly I think in malpractice
cases where a person consents to one operation and the operation is
performed. It is then found that something else is involved that is danger-
ous and should be removed at the time. I think the doctor has implied
consent to do that. My guess would be that this more frequently arises
in the cases of physician-patient relations than in the investigator-subject
relationship. Another point I would like to raise is this. If you look at
Number 9 of the Nuremberg principles, it is stated that during the
course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring
the experiment to an end. I am asking this as a matter of information,
are there not certain types of experimentation where the sudden inter-
ruption of it on the patient's decision alone would be the equivalent of
a death sentence? In such a case would the investigator be liable if he
continued the administration of a drug to an experimentally infected
subject? I am curious about that particular provision of these Nuremberg
principles.
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BONDY:
You mean, suppose a patient who had been infected with typhoid fever
wanted to bow out and therefore not get Chloromycetin? I guess he would
get it anyhow if he had typhoid.
DONNELLY:
Would that then create liability on the part of the investigator under
these principles? I don't think it would.
SMITH:
I think that Number 1 has something to say about that, namely, the
idea that the consent has to be bound by certain conditions insofar as the
individual can be provided with some knowledge. The difficulty of making
consent absolutely precise, which we will all agree to, doesn't follow from
that because it doesn't mean anything at all. It is once again a matter
of trying to make more precise these boundary conditions. In the very
first proposition there is reference to understanding and decision. Now
again it is certainly the case that the layman is not going to be in the
position to evaluate all he is told. On the other hand, there should be, I
think from the other side, the awareness of some responsibilty to try to,
let us say, show the layman what he is in for. And I don't think this is
special in this area. I think in every area where there is a technical
language and technical knowledge that has something to do with a lay-
man you have that problem. I think that lawyers have this problem too
as to whether laymen know what a naught is and things like that when
he is asked to put himself in the hands of the legal advisor.
BEESON:
Well, in answer to the earlier question, a simple answer is no. I don't
think anybody says that it is all right to go ahead without consent, even
though other proprieties may have been satisfied. The troubling thing is
whether the patient is capable of really understanding and of giving an
informed consent, and the fact is that he is not. The physician experi-
mentor has to have the integrity and do the best he can to lay out a fair
case, but with the understanding that the patient does not appreciate
exactly what is going on or what will be done. As I said earlier, there
probably are times when the experimentor realizes he can't spell out
in detail all the things that might happen any more than the physician
who is about to do an appendectomy could spell out to the patient all
the complications that could arise from an appendectomy. The operation
wouldn't be done.
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Audience Question:
I would like to ask about the legal and philosophic aspects of consent.
DONNELLY:
There are two problems here. I think No. 1 of the Nuremberg prin-
ciples raises a serious question as to the use of placebos since complete
disclosure is required. Another question is whom do you get consent
from? Take children. As I understand the polio experiment, there was
some risk not only that the child who was given the injection might be
harmed, but that neighborhood children might also get the disease. Now
do you go around the neighborhood and require consent from the parents
of those children? As I recall it, it was decided not to. As far as the
children who were given the injection were concerned, it was felt there
was a potential benefit to the child. This notion of benefit enters into
the picture whenever you are dealing with children or with mentally ill
people. If the subject is likely to benefit either presently or potentially
from the experiment, then parental consent or guardian consent is deemed
sufficient. Again I point out this has not been litigated to my knowledge
in any detail.
SMITH:
With regard to No. 5 since you singled it out, I would regard that as
one of the more unrealistic statements of the list with the expression
"a priori reason" being entirely too strong there. I take it that they take
the qualification a priori to indicate that there would be some certainty
about it, and I think it is fairly obvious with regard to any situation
where you have actual conditions present that what you might think to
be certain of in advance would be very minimal. You would have to put
this in terms of probability. You might say that if three people were
standing in a row you would know before the fact that one of them would
be between the other two, but that is a model of the kind of thing that
could be said to be a priori so it would have to be put in terms of probability.
From my standpoint it is entirely too strong.
DONNELLY:
I would agree with that. Also going back to No. 1 as to the nature
of the disclosure. The second line from the bottom provides that "all
inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected must be disclosed."
I would question "reasonably to be expected," particularly when you are
dealing with an initial experiment. I think that as a lawyer I would be
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inclined to substitute probable hazards, speaking in terms of probability
rather than reasonableness.
Audience Question:
In answer to Dr. Bondy's suggestion that we have a more realistic
code than the one at the Nuremberg trial, you responded that it is more
effective to have an approach beyond the reach of practicality rather
than be satisfied every day. Then Dr. Bondy mentioned conscience as
a principal factor which controlled the position of his obligations. Do you
feel the only way a physician can be restrained by his conscience with
respect to moral issues is by finding himself in a position where he
is subjected to a feeling of guilt as a result of not satisfying certain
codes of ethics?
SMITH:
Well, let me answer the last part of it first. I usually don't bother
with persons who are too convinced that what they are already doing is
what they ought to do. But with regard to the matter of the code being
beyond our reach, it seems to me we had an illustration of this a moment
ago. It was suggested that perhaps we had said that consent was not
necessary. We had not said that. We had said that consent was necessary
but at the same time that we are perfectly well aware of all the difficulties
of saying precisely and exactly what it means. To me it makes all the
difference in the world to say that consent is necessary but admittedly
difficult to obtain under ideal conditions, and to say that it can be
ignored because it is hard to apply. It would have to get so difficult to
apply that it didn't mean anything at all for us to identify the case where
it is ambiguous with the case where it doesn't make any difference. So
that in a system in which consent doesn't count you get a very different
kind of system from the one that presumably didn't want to operate with-
out consent, and no amount of calling attention to the difficulty of making
it precise shall take the place of that condition. Once again you have the
difference between a human being who may from a chemical standpoint
be worth 98 cents, but who from the standpoint of the human person
(which by the way is understood by all of us in our own case) is another
story.
Audience Question:
Since consent is so hard to define, and the information necessary for
"informed" consent is so difficult to provide, would you like to change
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the system to eliminate the need for consent and depend only on the
conscience of the experimentors and their supervisory panel?
BONDY:
No, I would not. At the risk of seeming to stick my chin out for Dr.
Smith's round house, I would like to say I really think that what we
are doing is pretty good. We do our best to explain to the subject what
we are going to do, and why we want to do it, and then we hope he
will say it is all right. There are many reasons for wanting him to say
that it is all right; we have talked about the important ethical and
moral ones; but there also are practical ones. If the subject isn't willing
-you can't use him. He won't cooperate and the experiment probably
won't work. For most purposes we need not only a person who has
consented, but who is cooperative and willing to go along with what we
want to do. There are operational advantages to getting consent. But aside
from that, I can't conceive that a person who considers himself a physician
would be willing to do an experiment on a subject who did not consent.
The problem we all come into is the question of how much has to be
told to the subject to get him to consent; and this can be very difficult
as we said repeatedly. Nevertheless, I don't think that it would be better to
try to set up a system in which consent were not an important-perhaps
the most important-single criterion of availability of the subject.
BEESON:
Now, I'll answer that too. I think we want consent and we want as
informed consent as we can get. What we are facing here is a very
troubling thing, that we as physicians, in the interest of advancing medical
knowledge and improving medical care, are deliberately doing things which
have some risk, slight as it may be. We would like to surround this with
all of the possible precautions, and one of the things we are surrounding
it with is this discussion. This is a good thing to make us face this issue
squarely and make us think about it. But certainly the consent business
seems to me to be one of the prime things to be attained. I know it can't
be obtained properly by working with children or with mental defectives,
and that many of our adult subjects because of disease or their mentalities
are hardly capable of giving proper consent, but we must do everything
we can to come close to doing this perfectly.
Thank you all very much for coming, and thanks especially to Pro-
fessor Smith and Professor Donnelly for helping us to think about a
deeply troubling subject.
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